28 lines
1 KiB
Markdown
28 lines
1 KiB
Markdown
# Backup
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Personal backup application
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## Threat Model
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### Objectives
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- Data is securely encrypted at rest and cannot be extracted without the repository private key
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- Data can be verified to come from any specific device
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- Without the encryption key it should be possible to make a safe guess as to what data is no longer in use.
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- Access to the repository private key requires hardware-backed multi-factor access
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- An attacker with write-access to the storage backend should not be able to modify or forge data in an unnoticeable manner
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- The backup clients cannot cause harm to the already backed-up data.
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### Out of scope
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- The owner gives an attacker both the hardware key and the password to it
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- The backup server host is compromised
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- An attacker with write-access to the storage backends deleting or otherwise destroying the data contained within.
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- An attacker with write-access to the backed up device can modify the data that is backed up
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### Diagrams
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#### Creating a repository
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