* sparc-tdep.c (sparc_fetch_wcookie): New function.

(sparc32_frame_prev_register): Handle StackGhost.
(sparc_supply_rwindow, sparc_collect_rwindow): Likewise.
This commit is contained in:
Mark Kettenis 2004-01-31 15:42:24 +00:00
parent 53904d1e5f
commit 42cdca6c41
2 changed files with 91 additions and 0 deletions

View file

@ -1,3 +1,9 @@
2004-01-31 Mark Kettenis <kettenis@gnu.org>
* sparc-tdep.c (sparc_fetch_wcookie): New function.
(sparc32_frame_prev_register): Handle StackGhost.
(sparc_supply_rwindow, sparc_collect_rwindow): Likewise.
2004-01-29 Roland McGrath <roland@redhat.com>
* configure.in (NEW_PROC_API): Also match solaris2.9 for this test.

View file

@ -105,6 +105,48 @@ sparc_fetch_instruction (CORE_ADDR pc)
insn = (insn << 8) | buf[i];
return insn;
}
/* OpenBSD/sparc includes StackGhost, which according to the author's
website http://stackghost.cerias.purdue.edu "... transparently and
automatically protects applications' stack frames; more
specifically, it guards the return pointers. The protection
mechanisms require no application source or binary modification and
imposes only a negligible performance penalty."
The same website provides the following description of how
StackGhost works:
"StackGhost interfaces with the kernel trap handler that would
normally write out registers to the stack and the handler that
would read them back in. By XORing a cookie into the
return-address saved in the user stack when it is actually written
to the stack, and then XOR it out when the return-address is pulled
from the stack, StackGhost can cause attacker corrupted return
pointers to behave in a manner the attacker cannot predict.
StackGhost can also use several unused bits in the return pointer
to detect a smashed return pointer and abort the process."
For GDB this means that whenever we're reading %i7 from a stack
frame's window save area, we'll have to XOR the cookie.
More information on StackGuard can be found on in:
Mike Frantzen and Mike Shuey. "StackGhost: Hardware Facilitated
Stack Protection." 2001. Published in USENIX Security Symposium
'01. */
/* Fetch StackGhost Per-Process XOR cookie. */
ULONGEST
sparc_fetch_wcookie (void)
{
/* FIXME: kettenis/20040131: We should fetch the cookie from the
target. For now, return zero, which is right for targets without
StackGhost. */
return 0;
}
/* Return the contents if register REGNUM as an address. */
@ -666,6 +708,29 @@ sparc32_frame_prev_register (struct frame_info *next_frame, void **this_cache,
return;
}
/* Handle StackGhost. */
{
ULONGEST wcookie = sparc_fetch_wcookie ();
if (wcookie != 0 && !cache->frameless_p && regnum == SPARC_I7_REGNUM)
{
*optimizedp = 0;
*lvalp = not_lval;
*addrp = 0;
*realnump = -1;
if (valuep)
{
CORE_ADDR addr = cache->base + (regnum - SPARC_L0_REGNUM) * 4;
ULONGEST i6;
/* Read the value in from memory. */
i6 = get_frame_memory_unsigned (next_frame, addr, 4);
store_unsigned_integer (valuep, 4, i6 ^ wcookie);
}
return;
}
}
/* The previous frame's `local' and `in' registers have been saved
in the register save area. */
if (!cache->frameless_p
@ -1163,6 +1228,16 @@ sparc_supply_rwindow (struct regcache *regcache, CORE_ADDR sp, int regnum)
{
target_read_memory (sp + ((i - SPARC_L0_REGNUM) * 4),
buf + offset, 4);
/* Handle StackGhost. */
if (i == SPARC_I7_REGNUM)
{
ULONGEST wcookie = sparc_fetch_wcookie ();
ULONGEST i6 = extract_unsigned_integer (buf + offset, 4);
store_unsigned_integer (buf + offset, 4, i6 ^ wcookie);
}
regcache_raw_supply (regcache, i, buf);
}
}
@ -1206,6 +1281,16 @@ sparc_collect_rwindow (const struct regcache *regcache,
if (regnum == -1 || regnum == SPARC_SP_REGNUM || regnum == i)
{
regcache_raw_collect (regcache, i, buf);
/* Handle StackGhost. */
if (i == SPARC_I7_REGNUM)
{
ULONGEST wcookie = sparc_fetch_wcookie ();
ULONGEST i6 = extract_unsigned_integer (buf + offset, 4);
store_unsigned_integer (buf + offset, 4, i6 ^ wcookie);
}
target_write_memory (sp + ((i - SPARC_L0_REGNUM) * 4),
buf + offset, 4);
}